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Abstract
This paper proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new prod-
ucts when demand is uncertain. In this framework, under general conditions, the threat
of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante. Asymmetric market power
in the ex post market exacerbates the problem. The implications of these general results
are examined in a series of examples that represent important markets in the computer
industry. The ﬁrst is a model that shows how an operating system monopolist, by its
mere presence, can deter the invention of complements, to its own detriment as well
as that of society. The implications of policies such as patent protection, price regu-
lation, and mandatory divestiture are considered. Three additional examples consider
the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated product,
a pair of horizontally diﬀerentiated ﬁrms that can add a new feature to their products,
and a platform leader that can be challenged in its base market by the supplier of a
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11 Introduction
Consider two ﬁrms, each interested in developing the same new product. Suppose that
demand for the product is known, and the ﬁrms decide simultaneously whether or not to
enter the market.1 If monopoly proﬁts are high, duopoly proﬁts are low, and development
costs are moderate, then there are two pure strategy equilibria, in each of which exactly one
ﬁrm enters. If after the ﬁrst ﬁrm enters, the ﬁrm that chose not to enter initially is given a
second chance to enter, it will decline the opportunity.
This simple picture changes drastically when demand for the new product is unknown. In
this paper I show that the introduction of demand uncertainty can lead both ﬁrms to forego
entry even when development costs are moderate, leaving a promising market untapped.
I develop a two-period framework for studying this problem in Section 2, and show that
invention is foregone when a ﬁrm with moderately high entry costs can beneﬁt ex post from
free riding on the demand information revealed by the ﬁrst mover. Because the ﬁrst mover
cannot internalize this informational externality, some invention that may be both privately
and socially beneﬁcial is foregone due to the threat of ex post entry by the free-riding
ﬁrm. Though symmetric ﬁrms may also deter each other from investing, the problem is
exacerbated when a ﬁrm with moderately high entry costs has an ex post selling advantage.
More precisely, if the ﬁrst mover has entered the market and revealed high demand, a
second mover may beneﬁt from entering the market ex post, if its entry costs are outweighed
by its prospective proﬁts as a duopolist. Ex ante, the ﬁrst mover recognizes it will earn either
low monopoly proﬁts if demand is low, or low duopoly proﬁts if demand is high and the
second mover enters ex post. Hence the ﬁrst mover may not want to enter the market ex
ante unless its entry costs are very low. As for the second mover, why does it not elect to
become the ﬁrst mover? Because demand is uncertain, so its expected proﬁts are too low to
justify incurring the entry costs, even though it would enter ex post if demand were known
to be high. Though this reasoning was asymmetric, it can apply to symmetric situations,
where the possibility that each ﬁrm could play the ex post role of the second mover deters
the other from entering ex ante in its role as the ﬁrst mover.
I apply these general results to four examples drawn from stylized facts in the computer
software industry. The invention of software products is fraught with uncertainty, and com-
plementarities among markets create asymmetries among ﬁrms. In Section 3, I examine a
model with a base system monopolist that also competes in a complementary application
market. The monopolist owns a selling advantage since consumers must purchase a base
system in order to use the application. In this setting, the base system monopolist, by its
mere presence, can depress the invention of complements to its own detriment. In Section 4,
1In this paper I use “development”, “investment”, and “entry” as synonyms; “invention” and “innovation”
refer to the ﬁrst act of investment in a particular product category.
2I adapt the basic framework to three other examples of competition common in software
markets: the bundling of software applications; the addition of new features to horizon-
tally diﬀerentiated products; and an example inspired by the “divided technical leadership”
hypothesis of Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999), in which the salient threats to a platform
leader are complementors rather than new entrants. Section 5 discusses the results and
reviews the related literature.
The main result—that invention may be foregone due to the threat of ex post entry—
depends on two key forces. The ﬁrst is the uncertainty inherent in the process of invention,
which puts a wedge between ex ante and ex post incentives. The second is entry cost
heterogeneity across ﬁrms, which implies that some ﬁrms may have an incentive to enter an
empty product market while other ﬁrms will not enter until the level of demand has been
revealed. A third force, asymmetry in the ex post selling stage, although it is not necessary
for the result (as the example in Section 4.2 demonstrates), ampliﬁes the problem because
a high entry cost ﬁrm with a selling advantage has a greater incentive to free ride on the
information externality that is generated when a low entry cost ﬁrm reveals demand.
In software markets, uncertainty takes two primary forms: technological uncertainty and
demand uncertainty. Technological uncertainty stems directly from complexity. Although
it may be simple to determine in theory whether a program can be written to accomplish
a task, the amount of eﬀort and coordination among programmers required to write the
program is unknown. Demand uncertainty also has its source in the inherent complexity
of computer software—potential consumers for a product that does not exist may have
diﬃculty perceiving or articulating their needs for the product. And even after purchasing
a software product, they may engage in what Bresnahan and Greenstein (1996) term “co-
invention”: the process of discovering how the software’s capabilities interact with existing
organizations and habits, and of applying the software to uses not foreseen by its inventors.
In this paper all the uncertainty is on the demand side, but a similar result would obtain if
demand were known but the technological uncertainty faced by an early entrant were more
severe than the uncertainty faced by subsequent entrants.
Cost heterogeneity across ﬁrms is central to many of the results. In the model of Sec-
tion 3, for example, if entry costs were identical across ﬁrms then there would be no reason
for a base system monopolist to ever decline to enter a promising complementary applica-
tion market, and as a consequence there would be no reason for an independent ﬁrm to ever
contemplate entry. Firms might face substantially diﬀerent entry costs for any of a host
of reasons. There might be legal constraints, such as patents or antitrust concerns; there
might be history-dependent eﬀects, such as learning-by-doing or unique human capital re-
tained by a particular ﬁrm; there might be consequences of past decisions regarding internal
organization, ﬁnancing, or employee compensation that are costly to change. Perhaps most
3importantly, ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes face diﬀerent problems of providing their employees with
incentives. However, invention can be foregone in contexts without cost heterogeneity, as in
the model of Section 4.2.
Asymmetry in the ex post selling stage can arise due to complementarity: a ﬁrm with a
monopoly over an existing product can enter a complementary market with a competitively
low price, yet still proﬁt by the accompanying increasing in demand for its monopoly product.
In such cases, the monopolist’s ex post advantage may be self-defeating ex ante, because
it deters the invention of complements. Asymmetry can also arise as a consequence of
substitutability: if a newly introduced product is complementary to a substitute for a ﬁrm’s
existing product, the ﬁrm may be forced to defend itself by developing a competing product
(Section 4.3 gives an example).
The problem of foregone invention is fundamentally one of appropriability—when a ﬁrm
cannot guarantee itself a monopoly over its invention, its incentives to invent are reduced.
To solve the appropriability problem, governments commonly employ patent systems that
guarantee a monopoly to each inventor. However, patents are socially desirable only when
inventions would not otherwise be undertaken, and undesirable otherwise. In the models I
present, under the same parameterizations for which there exist entry cost proﬁles that leave
privately proﬁtable opportunities unexploited, there are also cost proﬁles for which one or
more ﬁrms undertake invention even in the absence of patents. More desirable would be a
ﬁnely tuned patent system that awards a patent only when necessary to induce invention,
but the information requirements of such a system are heavy: it would need to know the
prior distribution of demand as well as the cost structures of all potential entrants. I discuss
the applicability of patents brieﬂy, but in the computer software industry patents are often
ruled out as a matter of law (software application programs are usually not patentable,
although particular aspects of an application program may be patentable) or because they
conﬂict with patents for pre-existing technologies.
2 The basic framework
The framework consists of a two-period game, t = 1,2, between two ﬁrms. There is an empty
potential market with unknown demand, and either ﬁrm j ∈ {M,X} (“M” for monopolist,
“X” for alternative) may enter the market after expending an idiosyncratic entry cost cj ≥ 0.
Firm j’s entry decision in period t is written as int
j or outt
j. Demand in the market is
revealed to both ﬁrms once any ﬁrm enters.2 Entry decisions are made simultaneously at
2It is not necessary for the results that demand be revealed perfectly; it is enough that entry by the ﬁrst
ﬁrm reveals some information to the second ﬁrm. Indeed, if the model were expanded to allow each ﬁrm to
privately observe a noisy signal of demand before period 1, then entry by the ﬁrst ﬁrm would reveal that it
had observed a signal of high demand. The second ﬁrm would then update its estimate of demand.
4the start of each period; exit is not considered and entry costs cannot be recovered. In
the basic framework, instead of modeling price and quantity decisions explicitly, I take per-
period proﬁts as the primitive element.3 (The examples in later sections model price and
quantity decisions in detail.) Let ω be the level of demand, which is initially unknown
but whose probability distribution is common knowledge. The payoﬀ for ﬁrm j in period
t given demand ω is indicated by πt
j(s,ω), where s is the market structure, or the set of
ﬁrms that have already entered. Rather than write s in set notation, I adopt the shorthand
s ∈ {∅,M,X,MX} for brevity. In the absence of entry (s = ∅), ω is irrelevant, so the payoﬀ
for ﬁrm j is written simply as πt
j(∅). All these details—including cM and cX—are common
knowledge.4
The extensive form of this game is shown in Figure 1. The probabilistic nature of ω is
indicated by the choice of “Nature,” which chooses at the nodes marked “N”. Note that if
neither ﬁrm enters in the ﬁrst period, then neither of them is allowed to enter in the second
period. I make this restriction to focus on the incentives for ex ante entry when there is
a possibility of ex post entry. This restriction also allows the two-period framework to be
mapped onto inﬁnite horizon models, as in the later sections, in which each ﬁrm may enter
at any time. In such models the incentives to enter are stationary; i.e., if invention is ever
rational in any period, then it is rational in the ﬁrst period.
Lemma 1, in the Appendix, derives the conditions under which neither ﬁrm enters the
empty market in any subgame perfect equilibrium. Lemma 1 requires no structure on the
proﬁt functions, but to model realistic situations it helps to impose some assumptions on
the structure of proﬁts. The following assumptions are maintained for the remainder of this
section and are satisﬁed by all the examples in later sections.







j (∅) + π2
j (∅) for all j.
Assumption 2 (Common demand). ω ∈ [0,1] and πt
j(s,ω) is increasing in ω for all j ∈ s.
Assumption 3 (Competitiveness). πt
j(j,ω) > πt
j(MX,ω) for all j, all t, and all ω > 0.
Assumption 4 (Positive proﬁts). πt
j(MX,ω) > πt
j(−j,ω) for all j, all t, and all ω > 0.
3Diﬀerences in proﬁts across time do not play an important role in the basic framework. However,
expressing the proﬁts as a function of time aids in mapping the framework onto applications.
4This framework includes, as a special case, the model of Jensen (2004), in which a large ﬁrm and a small
ﬁrm can adopt a cost-reducing innovation of uncertain success, with asymmetric payoﬀs due to the presence
of multiplant economies, but under the extreme assumption that any entrant in the ﬁrst period earns zero
proﬁts in that period. Jensen (1992a, 2001) are also closely related, but allow entry in the second period
if neither ﬁrm has entered in the ﬁrst period. Both these papers focus on the identity of the ﬁrst adopter,
rather than on underinvestment. See Section 5 for a discussion.
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Figure 1: Extensive form of the basic framework
These assumptions deﬁne a class of interesting situations. If relevance holds, then the
empty market oﬀers enough proﬁt potential that each ﬁrm would enter if its entry cost were
suﬃciently low and it knew that it would gain a monopoly. If common demand holds, then
demand is characterized by a single parameter and an increase in that parameter leads to
higher proﬁts for every ﬁrm in the market. If competitiveness holds, then each ﬁrm prefers
to monopolize the market rather than share it with a competitor. Positive proﬁts means
that revenues for any ﬁrm in the market will always cover its operating costs, so that the
act of entry risks at most the entry costs.
An additional deﬁnition formalizes the idea that a ﬁrm faces a disadvantage in the ex
post market.














6That is, Firm X (for example) gains less from investing when Firm M also invests than
it gains from investing when Firm M does not invest. If Firm X’s proﬁts when it does not
enter the market do not depend on Firm M’s action (i.e., πt
X (M,ω) = πt
X (∅) for all ω and
all t), then competitiveness implies that investments are strategic substitutes for Firm X.
Otherwise, that investments are strategic substitutes for Firm X implies that Firm M’s entry
does not depress Firm X’s proﬁts (e.g., in some related market) too much when Firm X does
not invest. Investments can be strategic substitutes for both ﬁrms, but in the results that
follow they need only be strategic substitutes for at least one ﬁrm—which I name Firm X.
When Firm X perceives investments as strategic substitutes, there are situations in which
Firm X does not enter a promising market. Deﬁne ˆ cj as the entry cost at which ﬁrm j is
exactly indiﬀerent between investing and not investing in the absence of ﬁrm −j:







j (∅) − π2
j (∅). (2)
If Firm M were for some reason unable to enter the market, then at entry cost ˆ cX Firm X
would be indiﬀerent between entering and not entering. Since Firm M is able to enter ex
post, there exists a threshold entry cost ˜ cM > 0 below which it will indeed enter with positive
probability once demand is revealed. Then Firm X’s strict best response given entry cost
ˆ cX is not to enter. That Firm X perceives investments as strategic substitutes means that
Firm X has less incentive to enter when Firm M enters, so if Firm M were to enter ex ante
then Firm X’s strict best response given ˆ cX also would be not to enter. Since these strict
best responses also hold in a neighborhood around ˆ cX, there are costs cX < ˆ cX at which,
given cM < ˜ cM, Firm X does not enter in equilibrium even though it would strictly prefer
to enter given cM > ˜ cM. Lemma 2, in the Appendix, makes this argument formally.
Combining the results for the individual ﬁrms reveals the conditions under which neither
ﬁrm enters a promising market. It is helpful to visualize each ﬁrm’s optimal ﬁrst period entry
decision as a function of its entry cost proﬁle, as is shown in Figure 2A for Firm X. The
region in which Firm X does not enter the market solely due to the possibility of entry by
Firm M covers intermediate values of cX and low values of cM. Overlaying the regions in
which Firm M and Firm X do not enter in the ﬁrst period, as is shown in Figure 2B, reveals
a region of concern in which neither ﬁrm enters the market even though at least one ﬁrm
would enter if it could be assured of a monopoly. I call this the region of foregone invention.
Deﬁnition 2. A region of foregone invention is a set of cost vectors {(c2,c2)} with
positive measure5 for which (i) no ﬁrm enters in any subgame perfect equilibrium, (ii) but
at least one ﬁrm would enter in a subgame perfect equilibrium if it could be assured a
monopoly.
5Lebesgue measure in CA × CB, where cj ∈ Cj = R+.
7A. Firm X’s optimal action in period 1
B. The region of foregone invention
Firm X does not enter because cX
is too high
Firm X does not enter because cM
is low enough that Firm M will sub-
sequently enter for too many ω
Firm X enters because cM is high
enough that Firm M will not subse-
quently enter for too many ω
Firm X enters because cX is low
enough that subsequent entry by
Firm M is not a deterrent
Firm X enters because cX is so low
that simultaneous entry by Firm M
is not a deterrent
Neither ﬁrm enters because both
face high entry costs
Foregone invention; neither ﬁrm en-
ters, although the market is promis-
ing for at least one ﬁrm
Firm X enters in period 1
Firm M enters in period 1
At least one ﬁrm enters in period 1
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Figure 2: The region of foregone invention in the basic framework Each
graph displays the cost space, with cM on the horizontal axis and cX on the vertical axis.
It is important to note that when the parameters of the game fall in the region of foregone
invention, there does not exist any equilibrium in which entry occurs. This rules out not
only pure strategy equilibria in which one or both ﬁrms enters for sure, but also mixed
strategy equilibria in which one or both ﬁrms enters with probability less than one. Hence,
in such situations, invention is foregone with certainty.
The region of foregone intervention covers an area of intermediate entry costs, because
very high entry costs or very low entry costs make the deterrence of invention either diﬃcult
or moot. More speciﬁcally, if Firm X has very low entry costs it is not likely to be deterred
by the prospect of Firm M’s entry, while if Firm M has very high entry costs it is less
likely to enter and thus poses less of a threat to Firm X. On the other hand, if Firm X
8has very high entry costs then it is unlikely to enter even without the threat of Firm M’s
subsequent entry, while if Firm M has low entry costs then it is likely to enter ex ante
regardless of whether it deters Firm X. It is quite possible that these eﬀects that operate
against foregone invention may overlap, in which case the region of foregone invention does
not exist. Figure 2B suggests that the region of foregone invention will have positive measure
if the curves that divide entry from non-entry for each ﬁrm do not intersect at (ˆ cM,ˆ cX). In
fact this is the case, as is implied by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Let s∗
j (ω,cj) indicate the market structure that results from Firm j’s se-
























then the region of foregone invention has positive measure.
Eq. 4 requires that Firm M has an ex post incentive to enter when its entry cost is
high enough that it does not enter ex ante. The proof (in the Appendix) uses Assumptions
1–4 and Eq. 4 to establish that (out1
M,out1
X) is an equilibrium at entry cost proﬁles near
(ˆ cM,ˆ cX), while Firm X’s perception that investments are strategic substitutes rules out the
possibility that (in1
M,in1
X) is also an equilibrium.6
Under what conditions is Eq. 4 likely to be satisﬁed? The left hand side is high when
Firm X’s monopoly proﬁts in the new product market are likely to be high; the right hand
side is low when Firm X’s duopoly proﬁts are likely to be low and when Firm M is likely to
enter ex post. Thus the condition is more likely to be satisﬁed if Firm M has an advantage
over Firm X in the ex post market, since Firm M is more likely to enter ex post if its
duopoly proﬁts are likely to be high. Although there are symmetric conditions that can
lead to foregone invention, symmetry increases or decreases both ﬁrms’ duopoly proﬁts in
tandem, leading to counteracting eﬀects on the right hand side of Eq. 4. But as Firm M
grows stronger ex post at the expense of Firm X, ex post entry becomes more likely and
Firm X’s expected proﬁts fall unambiguously. Hence foregone invention is a more serious
problem when ex post market power is asymmetric. In subsequent sections I explore several
6These are suﬃcient, but not necessary, conditions for foregone invention. It is possible for invention to
be foregone when Eq. 4 does not hold, such as when the curves that divide entry from non-entry for each
ﬁrm intersect at (ˆ cM,ˆ cX) but also intersect at other points.
9examples of asymmetric market power, in which the asymmetry derives from one ﬁrm’s
market power in a related market.7
In sum, the basic framework provides a convenient characterization of situations in which
invention may be foregone. The conditions that lead to foregone invention are two: one ﬁrm
must perceive ex ante investments as strategic substitutes, and the other ﬁrm must have an
ex post incentive to enter when it would not enter ex ante (Eq. 4).8 The region (in entry
cost space) of foregone invention, if it exists, occupies entry cost proﬁles with intermediate
entry cost levels for both ﬁrms. There is more likely to be a signiﬁcant region of foregone
invention when ex post market power is asymmetric, because one ﬁrm is more likely to be
deterred from investing if the other ﬁrm has an ex post advantage. Because they are based
on reduced form payoﬀ functions, these insights can be applied to a wide range of market
situations, including inﬁnite horizon problems, as shown in the sections that follow.
3 Invention to complement a base system
In this section, I show that a computing platform with a base system monopolist is liable to
experience foregone invention. The problem is that the base system monopolist possesses an
ex post advantage in markets for complementary products since it can enter a complementary
market with a low price yet still beneﬁt from the increased demand for its base system. In
this “Base System” model, Firm M has a pre-existing and exogenously protected monopoly
in the market for software operating systems, while the empty market is for a software
application that requires Firm M’s base system in order to run. Firm X is a startup ﬁrm
that can enter the empty market. The asymmetric complementarity between the base system
and the application ampliﬁes the problem of foregone invention, to the potential detriment
of both ﬁrms as well as to social welfare.
Although designed to represent aspects of the computer software industry, the model
applies to any set of markets in which one product (a “base system”) is required for the
operation of others (“applications”) and in which there is potential for the invention of new
applications. Gawer and Henderson (2002) and Gawer and Cusumano (2002) pose an exam-
ple in the computer hardware industry: Intel, given its dominant position in the market for
microprocessors, has an incentive to enter complementary markets because it can internalize
7There are other possible sources of asymmetry, such as asymmetric operating costs. For example, in
a two period model with Cournot competition the following parameterization yields a region of foregone
invention with positive measure: demand Q = ω (10 − p), uncertainty ω = 1 with probability γ and ω = 0
otherwise, and marginal costs of 0 for Firm M and 3 for Firm X.
8This is why no invention is foregone in the absence of demand uncertainty: without demand uncertainty
any ﬁrm that would enter ex post would also enter ex ante. Note that if entry decisions are made literally
simultaneously, then there can be a mixed strategy equilibrium, but this equilibrium is not robust to the
possibility that one ﬁrm or the other might be able to make its entry decision just a little bit earlier.
10the complementarity. But Intel also beneﬁts when other ﬁrms innovate in these areas, be-
cause such innovations increase the market for Intel’s core products. When both Intel and
another ﬁrm are aware of an opportunity to open a new market, foregone invention may be a
problem if either demand in this market is unknown (as in the model), or, equivalently, if the
technological viability of the product is unknown. Intel has developed organizational struc-
tures that may help it commit not to “trample all over everybody’s business” (Gawer and
Henderson), and it has succeeded in keeping most of its eﬀorts focused on its core business.
However, Intel has entered a number of already-occupied complementary markets, including
videoconferencing, digital cameras, chipsets, motherboards, home networking, and network
adapters. The model in this section gives a theoretical rationale for the contrast between
Intel’s stated concern for complementors and its apparent inability to fully commit not to
behave aggressively toward them.
Naturally, another application of the model is to Microsoft’s dominant position in the
market for personal computer operating systems and the many applications that can run
on top of its Windows operating systems. Microsoft’s ex post success in the markets for
Windows applications—internet browsers, e-mail clients, media players, spreadsheets, word
processors, etc.—illustrates the strength of its ex post advantage. Since the foregone inven-
tion result predicts the non-existence of certain products, this variety of observed products
raises the question of whether the model’s predictions are falsiﬁable. However, the steadily
falling development costs that characterize computer technology imply that the develop-
ment costs for any given application will eventually leave of the region of foregone invention.
Accordingly, the results in this section suggest that a market structure with a base system
monopolist may pose hazards that retard innovation if, among the various potential prod-
ucts that can work with the base system, there are some for which independent ﬁrms have
lower development costs than the monopolist.
3.1 The model
Technology and ﬁrms Let {b,a} be the set of possible products—b for “base system” and
a for “application”—neither a durable good.9 The base system has already been developed
and is produced by Firm M, while Firm X is exogenously barred from the base system
market. Either Firm may enter the application market by incurring a ﬁxed cost cj > 0.
The application requires the base system in order to provide value, but the base system
can provide value without the application; i.e., the base system is “essential.” One way to
interpret this assumption is that it represents the potential for users to program their own
9Durable goods considerations in a dynamic oligopoly setting, as well as other similar concerns such as
network eﬀects, are beyond the scope of this paper. But the results in Section 2 indicate that the phenomenon
of foregone invention is general in the set of all models that satisfy the conditions that Proposition 1 places
on the proﬁt functions, and this set can accommodate these concerns.
11software to run on the base system. More broadly, it reﬂects the ability of the base system
to serve as a platform upon which any number of other software products can run.10
Markets and consumers Once ﬁrms have had the opportunity to develop the appli-
cation, they simultaneously set prices, produce at zero cost any products that they have
developed, and sell to consumers. The set of branded products available for sale to con-
sumers is s ⊂ {b,a} × {M,X}, where, for shorthand, kj ∈ s is product k sold by ﬁrm j
at price pk
j. The set s also represents the “industry structure”—the combination of ﬁrms
present in each market. For brevity, s will often be written in shorthand as ∅, M, X, or
MX to indicate which which ﬁrms have entered the application market.
There is a continuum of consumers with unit total mass, and each consumer i values
product k by the amount θk
i ∈ [0,1].11 Each consumer demands at most one of each
product in any period. In each period, each consumer i purchases a basket of branded




j).12 Since a consumer must
own the base system in order to make use of an application, utility maximization is subject
to the constraint that if si is non-empty then it must contain bM. Consumer values θb
i are
distributed uniformly on [0,1], while, prior to the ﬁrst period, demand in the application
market is unknown. With probability γ, θa
i are distributed uniformly on [0,1]; otherwise
θa
i = 0 for all i.
Dynamics The proﬁts for each ﬁrm in each type of market constitute a payoﬀ function
that can be plugged into the basic framework. This is accomplished by looking at the
problem through the lens of an inﬁnite period model13 in which the ﬁrms share a discount
factor δ ∈ (0,1), and letting the second period of the basic framework summarize the
discounted proﬁts in periods 2,...,∞. Since s = MX is an absorbing state, the equilibrium
can still be found by backward induction. As in the basic framework, each period t consists
of two stages, an investment stage and a selling stage. Once any ﬁrm enters the application
10This assumption contrasts with several earlier models in the literature which assume that both products
are used in ﬁxed proportions, as in Economides and Salop (1992), Matutes and Regibeau (1998), Farrell and
Katz (2000), and Choi and Stefanadis (2001) However, the asymmetry that is inherent when applications
require a base system in order to run provides Firm M with an ex post advantage that cannot be derived
under a ﬁxed proportions assumption. Heeb (2003) is a recent theoretical work that shares the assumption
of asymmetric complementarity.
11This implies that applications aM and aX are perfect substitutes. Adding a measure of product diﬀer-
entiation could quantitatively change the problem of foregone invention, but would not alter the qualitative
conclusions.
12If software is durable, then the measure of consumers in the market can be thought of as those who are
ready to upgrade. Since this Base System model does not allow for incremental improvement, the idea is
that upgrading is motivated by an exogenous baseline rate of improvement.
13The inﬁnite horizon provides stationary payoﬀs, whereas a two period model would force payoﬀs in the
second period to be perceived diﬀerently from the perspectives of the ﬁrst period and the second period.
12market, demand is revealed to all. Though the context is dynamic, I assume that market
pricing in each period reﬂects the static Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous pricing game;
collusive pricing is considered in Section 3.4.1.
The state vector at the start of each period consists of the sets of products that have been
developed by the ﬁrms together with the common prior distribution over demand for the
application. The state can be summarized in shorthand (and with some abuse of notation)
by the pair hs,ωi, where s ∈ {∅,M,X,MX}, ω = 1 if demand for the application is known
to be high, ω = 0 if demand for the application is known to be low, and ω = γ if demand
for the application is yet unknown.
3.2 Static prices and proﬁts
This section characterizes the static market equilibrium of the Base System model under
the various industry structures that can arise. These static outcomes enable us to analyze
the dynamic equilibrium in Section 3.3. The paragraphs that follow display the static
equilibrium prices and proﬁts for each ﬁrm under each industry structure in turn. The
derivations of these static equilibria are straightforward and thus omitted. Consumer choices
are shown in Figure 3, where the space of consumer valuations [0,1]2 is divided into regions
according to which consumers purchase which baskets, with θb on the horizontal axis and θa
on the vertical axis. Observe that whenever Firm M oﬀers the application, assuming that it
prices its two products separately is without loss of generality, since oﬀering a bundle would
be equivalent to setting a price of zero for the application. I call this “trivial bundling” when
it arises in equilibrium.
Base system monopoly When there is no application (i.e., ω is either γ or 0), Firm M
faces a simple monopoly problem. It sets its price for the base system at pb
M = 0.5, yielding
per-period proﬁts of πM(∅) = 0.25. Consumer choices are displayed in Figure 3A.
Integrated monopoly An integrated monopoly arises when Firm M monopolizes both
markets (with high demand for the application, i.e., ω = 1). In this case Firm M sets
prices pb
M = 0.667 and pa
M = 0.167, resulting in per-period proﬁts of πM(M,1) = 0.546.14
Consumer choices are displayed in Figure 3B.
The price for the application is relatively low because the application makes the base
system more valuable, allowing Firm M to price the base system well above the price it
would set as merely a base system monopolist. This illustrates how Firm M internalizes the
complementarity, yielding beneﬁts for consumers as well as itself.15
14For simplicity, I use notation as if three-digit approximations are exact.
15Note that consumer surplus also increases over the base system monopoly, although it is not a Pareto
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Figure 3: Consumer purchases as a function of tastes in the Base System
model Each graph displays the space of consumer tastes, with θb on the horizontal axis
and θa on the vertical axis. Regions are shaded according to which consumers purchase
which products.
14Bilateral monopoly A bilateral monopoly arises when Firm M monopolizes the base
system market and Firm X monopolizes the application market (with ω = 1). The ﬁrms set
equilibrium prices of pb
M = 0.586 and pa
X = 1 − pb
M. The per-period proﬁts are πM(X,1) =
0.343 and πX(X,1) = 0.172. Consumer choices are displayed in Figure 3C.
The price for the application is higher than under an integrated monopoly because
Firm X cannot reap the positive externality that its application provides to Firm M. Thanks
to this externality, Firm M can raise the price of its base system relative to the price
it would set in the absence of the application, but not to the level it would set as an
integrated monopolist. Both total industry proﬁts and consumer surplus are lower than
under integrated monopoly, illustrating the social consequences of Firm X’s inability to
internalize the complementarity. Despite the essentiality assumption maintained here, the
contrast between bilateral monopoly and integrated monopoly in this model follows the same
logic as in Cournot (1838) and other static models such as Economides and Salop (1992)
and Chen and Ross (1998).
Application duopoly When Firm M monopolizes the base system market but competes
with Firm X in the application market (with ω = 1), both ﬁrms set a price of zero for the
application, while Firm M sets a price of pb
M = 0.816 for the base system. The resulting
per-period proﬁts are πM(MX,1) = 0.544 and πX(MX,1) = 0. Consumer choices are
displayed in Figure 3D.
Firm M trivially bundles its application with the base system, forcing Firm X to sell its
application at a zero price. By this strategy, Firm M achieves proﬁts nearly as high as if
it enjoyed an integrated monopoly. It is akin to the strategy of bundling demonstrated by
Nalebuﬀ (2000), except that here the bundling arises as a result of competitive pricing in the
application market and monopoly pricing in the base system market. This illustrates the
power of a base system monopoly. Ordinarily, no ﬁrm would enter a pre-existing market with
undiﬀerentiated Bertrand competition if in order to do so it would have to pay a positive
entry cost. But Firm M beneﬁts from selling the application even at a zero price because
by doing so it increases the price of its base system. As with integrated monopoly, both
total industry proﬁts and consumer surplus are higher than under bilateral monopoly, so
from an ex post perspective Firm M’s entry into the application market is both privately
and socially desirable so long as its investment costs are not too high.
improvement because some consumers who would buy the base system under a base system monopoly are
priced out of the market under integrated monopoly.
153.3 Dynamic equilibrium
Although the game is constructed with an inﬁnite horizon, it can be solved by backward
induction from the absorbing states. The analysis is equivalent to that of the basic frame-
work. Recall that Proposition 1 gave the conditions for foregone invention in the two period
basic framework. Proposition 2 applies that result to this inﬁnite horizon model.
Proposition 2. In the Base System model, if the prior distribution over demand is suﬃ-
ciently pessimistic (γ < 0.679) then the region of forgone invention has positive measure.
To gain a more economic interpretation of this result, it is helpful to look a little more
closely at the conditions that deﬁne the region of foregone invention. I ﬁrst identify three
eﬀects that drive Firm M’s investment incentives, and then analyze the equilibrium outcome
as a function of the entry cost proﬁle. This helps visualize the region of foregone invention
and identify two eﬀects that summarize how Firm X responds to Firm M’s incentives. Begin
with Firm M’s entry rules. When demand for the application is high, Firm M chooses to








Note that the right hand side may be large if Firm M can proﬁt in its base system market
by trivially bundling the application. Compare this to Firm M’s ex ante entry rule when







= ˆ cM. (6)
Most of the diﬀerence between Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 is due to two eﬀects: First, if Firm X
has already invested and revealed high demand, Firm M receives a higher payoﬀ even if it
does not invest because the availability of Firm X’s application makes Firm M’s base system
more valuable; i.e., πM(X,1) > πM(∅). This complementarity eﬀect reduces the incentive for
Firm M to invest. Second, if Firm X has already revealed that there is high demand for the
application, then Firm M’s expected payoﬀ from investing is higher, increasing its incentive
to invest. This demand revelation eﬀect is reﬂected in the absence of the uncertainty term
γ from from Firm M’s ex post entry rule (Eq. 5). A potential third eﬀect, the competitive
eﬀect, stems from the prospect of competition in the application market. It exerts almost no
inﬂuence on Firm M’s decision because Firm M can achieve almost as much proﬁt by trivial
bundling against Firm X as it can by monopolizing both market. The demand revelation
eﬀect swamps the competitive eﬀect except when γ is extremely close to 1. The demand
revelation eﬀect outweighs both the complementarity eﬀect and the competitive eﬀect when
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Figure 4: Equilibrium outcome as a function of costs in the Base System
model Each graph displays the cost space, with cM on the horizontal axis and cX on the
vertical axis. Regions are shaded according to which ﬁrm invests ﬁrst, and labeled according
to the type of equilibrium outcome.
γ < 0.679.
To graph the equilibrium outcome, suppose for a moment that δ = 0.9, and consider the
two cases γ = 0.8 and γ = 0.4. When γ = 0.8, equilibria in which Firm X and Firm M
invest ex ante share a region of overlap. This is illustrated in Figure 4A, where the region of
overlap is labeled as the region of ﬁrst mover advantage.16 Since γ = 0.8 > 0.679, there is no
region of foregone invention. Note that even if the ﬁrm with lower costs is the ﬁrst mover,
there is still productive ineﬃciency (conditional on some ﬁrm investing, it is the high–entry
cost ﬁrm that invests) over a signiﬁcant range of entry costs. This is a natural consequence
of entry cost heterogeneity combined with Firm M’s internalization of the complementarity.
When γ = 0.4, the regions in which Firm X and Firm M may invest ex ante do not
overlap, and a region of foregone invention ﬁlls the gap: in equilibrium, neither ﬁrm invests
even in situations in which investment could be privately proﬁtable under non-equilibrium
16There are some regions of the parameters in which either Firm M or Firm X, but not both, could invest
in pure strategy equilibrium. This implies the existence of an unstable mixed strategy equilibrium. However,
this mixed strategy equilibrium is not robust to a small ﬁrst-mover advantage for either ﬁrm. Accordingly, I
rule out mixed strategy equilibria and merely indicate that only the ﬁrst mover will invest, while remaining
agnostic regarding the identity of the ﬁrst mover.
17strategies. This is illustrated in Figure 4B. There are three factors that contribute to the
region of foregone invention, all of which are necessary in the Base System model. First,
the threat of encroachment: Firm X’s entry costs are high enough that it doesn’t want to
invest if Firm M will subsequently invest (when demand for the application is high). Second,
demand uncertainty: Firm M’s entry costs are high enough that it invests only if it knows
that demand for the application is high. Third, for γ = 0.4 the demand revelation eﬀect
outweighs the complementarity and competitive eﬀects, leading Firm M to invest if Firm X
has revealed that demand for the application is high.
In general, the region of foregone invention reaches its maximum area at an intermediate
level of uncertainty, γ = 0.340. This occurs for two reasons: First, if demand is less likely
to be high, then entry would be relatively unlikely even if foregone invention were not a
problem, so foregone invention can occur over only a small range of entry costs. Second, if
demand is more likely to be high (but still γ < 0.679), then ex post incentives are more in
line with ex ante incentives. For any ﬁxed γ ∈ (0,0.679), the region of foregone invention
grows with increasing δ. Although greater patience gives ﬁrms a greater incentive to invent
new products, it does not help align ex ante incentives with ex post incentives, so the range
of entry costs over which invention is foregone increases.
3.4 Strategies to encourage invention
The region of foregone invention is troubling for social welfare: opportunities to expand social
welfare by inventing new products may go unexploited even though they oﬀer potential for
private proﬁt. It is also troubling for Firm M, because it means that opportunities to expand
its core business may go unexploited. Under the assumption that, of the various application
development opportunities that may arise, each poses its own characteristic proﬁle of entry
costs for Firm M and any potential Firm X’s, both Firm M and a social regulator might be
interested in policy strategies for trying to overcome the problem of foregone invention. In
this section I ﬁrst consider how Firm M might try to encourage the invention of complements.
I then consider the eﬀects of several public policy interventions that a social regulator might
consider. I interpret these policies informally, both within the model and in the context
of some considerations outside the model. In general, I do not ﬁnd any policy that yields
an unambiguous improvement, unless the policy maker is assumed to have unrealistically
detailed information about market conditions.
3.4.1 Private strategies for encouraging invention
There are several strategies that Firm M might pursue in order to attempt to overcome the
problem of foregone invention. For example, it can merge with outside inventors like Firm X,
18it can sponsor a research tournament, it can attempt to collude in the ex post market, or
it can attempt to coordinate on a long run equilibrium in which it commits not to enter
certain types of markets.
Mergers From both a social standpoint and from the ﬁrms’ perspective, a situation in
which the application is ﬁrst invented by the ﬁrm with lower costs and then marketed by
Firm M is usually preferable to a situation in which Firm M invests to enter an application
market already occupied by Firm X. When Firm X has lower entry costs, there are two
classes of simple contractual remedies: one, Firm M buys Firm X (or the rights to sell its
application) ex post; two, Firm M buys Firm X ex ante. I consider each in turn.
Suppose that Firm M can oﬀer to buy Firm X ex post. For the moment, restrict attention
to situations in which cM is in an intermediate range for which invention may be foregone.
Once Firm X has revealed that demand for the application is high, Firm M prefers to buy
Firm X rather than pay the investment cost to compete in the application market. However,
since Firm M’s entry costs are relatively low, it can credibly threaten to enter the application
market on its own, giving Firm X an outside option of πX(MX,1) = 0. Firm M’s inﬂuence
over Firm X’s outside option leads to a low buyout price, making it diﬃcult for ex post
merger to solve the ex ante incentive problem.
When instead Firm M’s entry costs are high enough that it will not enter ex post, it oﬀers
Firm X a buyout price at least as high as Firm X’s outside option, 1
1−δ πX(X,1). Though
this has the helpful eﬀect of increasing the range of cX over which Firm X will invest when
Firm M poses no threat to enter the application market, the prospect of ex post merger
actually increases the region of foregone invention, because it increases the maximum entry
cost at which Firm X could proﬁt from a monopoly more than it increases the maximum
entry cost at which Firm X would invest when Firm M can threaten to enter.
If the ﬁrms could merge ex ante, then they could jointly internalize the complementarity
and eradicate the problem of foregone invention. There are two important reasons to think
that merging ex ante would be problematic, however. First, if entry costs were private
information then Firm M would face an adverse selection problem in identifying which ﬁrms
to choose as merger partners. In return for merging with Firm M, many ﬁrms might oﬀer
their development services even if their development costs were not low, since after the
merger they would be able to “hold up” Firm M and compel it to pay higher development
costs than it had anticipated. Second, even if the correct Firm X could be identiﬁed, the
transaction costs of the merger might outweigh the diﬀerence in entry costs between the two
independent ﬁrms. Such transaction costs could include not only the accounting costs of
the merger, but also the eﬀect on the incentives of the software engineers of moving from a
small ﬁrm to a larger ﬁrm.
19Research tournaments Firm M could attempt to solve the adverse selection problem
posed by ex ante mergers by oﬀering a tournament prize that independent ﬁrms could win
by developing the application. The prize, of course, would need to be large enough that
the desired contestants enter the tournament even though there is a strong likelihood of
losing. There is also the diﬃculty of identifying the correct application to invent, and
furthermore writing an appropriate contract for such a tournament would be diﬃcult. Since
software applications are complex objects, any contract that does not completely specify the
desired product will give the contestants distorted incentives that may lower the quality of
the winning application (which can be interpreted as raising the costs that Firm M must
incur to perfect the application after paying out the prize). For the speciﬁc setting of
computer software, the mere act of writing a substantive tournament contract could require
accomplishing a signiﬁcant portion of the development work.
Collusion Firm M and Firm X, having both introduced competing applications, could
collude to keep the prices of their applications above zero. Joint proﬁt maximization implies
that pb
M = 0.667 and pa
M = pa
X = 0.167, yielding proﬁts per period of 0.495 for Firm M
and 0.051 for Firm X if they split the application market equally. However, Firm M can
actually earn higher per period proﬁts (πM(MX,1) = 0.544) by driving the application
price to zero. Collusion on positive application prices is possible only if Firm X restricts its
output to much less than half of the total number of applications. This would leavs Firm X
with little in the way of proﬁts, and oﬀers little inducement to innovate in situations under
which Firm M will subsequently enter and collude.
Building a reputation for enabling complements The Base System model considers
a single application, but a fundamental characteristic of software operating systems is that
their functionality is open-ended. If a new potential application market arises in each period,
we might expect there to be an equilibrium in which Firm M does not enter certain com-
plementary markets already occupied by independent ﬁrms, because the independent ﬁrms
will cease innovating if they ever observe Firm M enter a forbidden complementary market.
Gawer and Cusumano (2002) theorize that Intel has pursued the strategy of attempting to
coordinate on such an equilibrium, characterizing its strategy as “communicating commit-
ment to third parties.” However, extending the model to allow for new applications each
period is problematic because it generates a dynamic game with an inﬁnite state space, for
which there is no folk theorem to invoke and for which static prices and proﬁts are diﬃcult
to compute, even numerically.17
17It can be shown that if total expenditure in the markets for applications and base systems is bounded,
then Firm M cannot commit to enabling complements even if the number of applications is unbounded.
203.4.2 Public policies for inducing invention
This section considers several potential policy interventions: a property rights approach
that gives Firm X a patent if it innovates ﬁrst, a structural regulation approach that forces
Firm M to divest from any applications it invents, and a price regulation approach that
prevents Firm M from driving application prices down. Throughout, I assume that the
policy planner cannot observe ﬁrms’ investment costs.
Patent protection The appropriability problem facing Firm X can be completely elim-
inated by a simple patent policy. Unfortunately, though patent protection eliminates the
problem of foregone invention, it poses other problems. In general, since patent protection
prevents competition, it can reduce social surplus whenever it is not necessary to induce
investment. This phenomenon manifests in at least three speciﬁc ways: First, the costs of
reduced competition are evident in the Base System model whenever Firm X’s entry costs
can be so low that Firm M’s subsequent entry does not dissuade Firm X from innovating
ex ante. In these situations, it is socially desirable ex ante for Firm M to enter a market
occupied by Firm X, but a patent policy prevents it from doing so. Second, though the
Base System model does not allow for vertical diﬀerentiation, a lack of competition can be
particularly problematic in markets in which incremental vertical (quality) improvement is
important because competition can induce ﬁrms to invest more in improving quality. Heeb
(2003) shows that Firm M is actually the stronger incremental innovator in such a situation,
so long as Firm X is not induced to exit. Third, the Base System model does not allow
for horizontal diﬀerentiation, and in markets in which consumers have varying horizontal
tastes it may be beneﬁcial to have multiple vendors to satisfy diﬀerent types of consumers.
Whether a patent policy is socially beneﬁcial in any given market is subject to the balance
between these three eﬀects on the one hand and the value of protecting innovators on the
other hand.
In the case of computer software, the issue of patent protection is often moot, because
an attempt to patent an entire software application could be blocked by any ﬁrm that holds
a patent on some aspect of the underlying technologies included in the application. For
example, many contemporary applications make use of patented compression, encryption,
and networking technologies. In particular, base system vendors like Microsoft and Intel
tend to hold many of these sorts of patents—enough to potentially head oﬀ attempts by
If instead the useful lifetimes of applications are uniformly bounded, then the folk theorem of Dutta
(1995) applies. However, the idea that applications have uniformly bounded lifetimes should be applied
with caution. Although a particular version of a particular application (e.g., Microsoft Word 5.0) may have
a short useful lifetime, in the model an “application” should be interpreted as a proxy for an application
category, which is likely to have a long or even indeﬁnite lifetime. Once the ﬁrst particular application in
any category has been invented and demand has been revealed, subsequent applications in that category are
subject to a qualitatively diﬀerent level of demand uncertainty.
21complementors to patent application categories.18 In addition, entire software applications
are generally not patentable.
Mandatory divestiture Because the model features undiﬀerentiated Bertrand competi-
tion, requiring Firm M to divest itself of any applications that it develops makes little sense:
the spun-oﬀ ﬁrm (call it Firm Y) would drive the application price to zero if s = XY , while
if s = X it would lead to a bilateral monopoly, which is inferior to an integrated monopoly.
However, a mandatory divestiture rule could potentially be useful in a model with horizon-
tal or vertical product diﬀerentiation. Horizontal product diﬀerentiation would allow both
Firm X and Firm Y to earn modest proﬁts when they compete, partially alleviating the
problem of foregone innovation. Not only would mandatory divestiture oﬀer greater incen-
tives for Firm X to innovate ex ante, it would also give Firm X a greater opportunity to
enter a market already occupied by Firm Y to provide a horizontally diﬀerentiated alterna-
tive.19 Vertical product diﬀerentiation combined with horizontal diﬀerentiation would give
Firms X and Y incentives for incremental quality improvement. On one hand, Heeb (2003)
shows that Firm Y would be a stronger incremental innovator if it were integrated with
Firm M, as long as Firm X is not induced to exit. On the other hand, Firm X is more likely
to be induced to exit when facing an integrated competitor than when facing a symmetric
competitor.
Unlike patent protection, mandatory divestiture cannot eliminate the problem of fore-
gone invention: Firm M still has some ex post incentive to develop the application in order
to induce Firm X and Firm Y to drive down application prices and increase demand for the
base system. Another downside of mandatory divestiture is that Firm M’s static pricing
policy no longer internalizes the complementarity between the base system and complemen-
tary applications, weakening Firm M’s ex ante incentives to invest. Whether a mandatory
divestiture policy would be socially beneﬁcial depends on the balance among the social ben-
eﬁts of radical innovation, incremental improvement, product variety, and static eﬃciency,
as well as the probability distribution over entry costs.
Price regulation There are also more and less attractive policies of price regulation that
can be used to reduce Firm M’s threat to innovation without reducing its incentives to
innovate. A ﬁrst policy would be to prevent Firm M from excluding rivals by means other
than pricing, as in the U.S. Justice Department’s 2001 settlement with Microsoft. A more
severe second policy would be to regulate Firm M’s pricing so that, when it enters an
already-occupied market ex post, it cannot undercut its rival or bundle its application with
18See Bessen (2003) for a closer examination of this idea.
19Such entry is not necessarily socially beneﬁcial; whether it increases or decreases social surplus depends
on the speciﬁcation of demand and entry costs.
22any other products. In the Base System model presented here, pegging Firm M’s price
to Firm X’s price would restore some of the Firm X’s ex post proﬁts, alleviating but not
completely solving the foregone invention problem. Because it prevents trivial bundling, it
also reduces the incentive for Firm M to enter ex post. Outside the model, such a policy
would not harm incremental quality improvement—in fact, it gives Firm M an incentive to
create excellent products because it cannot compete on price. On the down side, such a
policy invites possibly ineﬃcient ex post entry by low-cost third parties. It also begs the
question of how to deﬁne the boundaries between application markets.
4 Additional examples
In this section I examine three additional examples that complement the Base System model
of Section 3. The purpose is to demonstrate how the ideas of the basic framework and the
Base System model can be applied to additional contexts. Each example is motivated by an
interesting phenomenon in the computer software market, each leading to foregone invention
in a qualitatively diﬀerent way. What all the examples share is a vertical relationship between
a potential new product an established product over which some ﬁrm has market power.
The nature of the vertical relationship determines the conditions under which invention is
foregone.
All the examples here rely on a demand system similar to that in the Base System model.
The derivation of period proﬁts under various market structures is accordingly analogous,
so I do not present the details in the text.
4.1 Bundling unrelated products
The ﬁrst example is bundling with commitment, by which a ﬁrm can leverage market power
even from an unrelated market. The ability to commit to bundling creates an artiﬁcial
vertical relationship where one does not arise naturally. In the Base System model, Firm M
was able to leverage its market power through trivial bundling because it controlled the base
system upon which the application depended. This “Bundling” example instead assumes that
products b and a are completely unrelated. This implies that the monopolist in the market
for product b can extend its market power to the market for product a only if it can ﬁnd a
device to create a relationship between the two products. The device I consider is an ability
to commit to oﬀer unrelated products only as a bundle.
This example is motivated in part by Microsoft’s dominance in the market for business
productivity software, and its practice of bundling a word processor, spreadsheet, personal
information manager, and presentation editor together under the brand “Microsoft Oﬃce.”
Nalebuﬀ (2004), Carlton and Waldman (2002), and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000) show that
23bundling can serve as an entry deterrent, and Bakos and Brynjolfsson speculate informally
that innovation incentives in an empty market will be distorted by the presence of a potential
bundler. Here, I show that Microsoft’s ex post option to bundle future products into Oﬃce
may deter the ex ante invention of these products. In the works cited above, the monopolist
initially monopolizes multiple markets and tries to prevent entry into one of them. Here,
the incumbent monopolizes only one market, while another market lies unoccupied, with
unknown demand.
As in Section 3.1, θb
i are distributed uniformly on [0,1], while θa
i are either distributed
uniformly on [0,1], with probability γ, or otherwise θa
i = 0 for all consumers. There are
two ﬁrms, M and X, and four relevant market structures, s ∈ {∅,M,X,MX}. In each
static market, Firm M ﬁrst chooses which bundles to oﬀer from among the products it
has developed, and then both ﬁrms set prices simultaneously. Since the two products are
unrelated, independent pricing is no longer without loss of generality. Accordingly, I allow
non-trivial bundling, including “mixed” bundling (in which a ﬁrm oﬀers a bundle alongside
independent products).The static prices and proﬁts are as follows:20
• When s = ∅, Firm M monopolizes its existing market, setting price pb
M(∅) = 0.5 and
earning proﬁts πM(∅) = 0.25, as in the Base System model.
• When s = M and demand for product a is high, Firm M monopolizes both markets,
and it oﬀers a bundle ba at price pba
M(M) = 0.862 as well as each product independently
at prices pb
M (M) = pa
M(M) = 0.667, giving it proﬁts of πM(M,1) = 0.549.
• When s = X and demand for product a is high, the two markets are independent
and each ﬁrm sets pb
M(X) = pa
X(X) = 0.5 and earns monopoly proﬁts πM(X,1) =
πX(X,1) = 0.25.
• When s = MX and demand for product a is high, Firm M oﬀers a bundle at price
pba
M(MX) = 0.607, while Firm X oﬀers its independent product at price pa
X(MX) =
0.245; this combination yields proﬁts of πM(MX,1) = 0.369 and πX(MX,1) = 0.067.
Firm M does not oﬀer either of its products independently: if it oﬀered product a
independently then Bertrand competition would drive its price to zero, while it cannot
gain from oﬀering product b independently because the bundle price is less than 0.667.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the period proﬁts in this model can lead to foregone
invention.
Proposition 3. In the Bundling example, if the prior distribution over demand is suﬃciently
pessimistic (γ < 0.398) then the region of foregone invention has positive measure.
20Though this example shares the demand setup of Nalebuﬀ’s model, these prices and proﬁts diﬀer slightly
due to diﬀerences in timing and because Nalebuﬀ does not consider mixed bundling.
24The condition on γ is more restrictive than in the Base System model, because Firm X
can earn some proﬁts competing against Firm M’s bundle. In this sense, a new product that
is not dependent on a base system is better insulated from ex post entry and therefore is
more likely to be invented.
Commitment is necessary for invention to be foregone. When s = MX, Firm M would
want to undercut Firm X’s price in the application market if it could renege on its bundling
commitment, so the price of product a would fall to zero under Bertrand competition. Thus
Firm M would not enter the market for product a ex post if it could not commit to bundling.
This implies a simple public policy remedy: do not allow Firm M to bundle any unrelated
products together with a product over which it has market power.
In this example, the two products are completely unrelated. But the results carry over to
the case of partial complementarity. If the new product a were complementary to Firm M’s
existing product b, then Firm M might enter in order to be able to increase the price on
product b. The intuition is similar to that of the Base System model: Firm M prefers
that complements to its own monopoly product should have low prices, and entering the
complementary markets in order to increase price competition is one way to accomplish that
goal. However, in the Base System model bundling was trivially implied when Firm M set a
zero price for its application because consumers needed to purchase Firm M’s base system
in order to use the application. Here, although complementarity makes price competition in
the new market valuable to Firm M in its monopoly market, Firm M would prefer to commit
to a bundle whenever the complementarity between the two products is less than perfect.
Firm X is able to earn positive proﬁts when Firm M enters with bundle pricing, but Firm X
earns zero proﬁts if Firm M enters without bundling. Thus when complementarity is strong
enough to induce Firm M to enter even if it could not commit to bundling, an ability to
commit to bundling has a beneﬁcial eﬀect on Firm X’s ex ante invention incentives. In this
way, bundling as an entry strategy is less destructive to social surplus when complementarity
is high.
4.2 Product features
The second example considers the addition of the same new feature to two horizontally
diﬀerentiated products: the “Product Features” example. The necessity of bundling the new
feature with an existing product is assumed as a technological constraint. In this example,
neither ﬁrm is privileged in the ex post market; instead, it is the fact that the new feature
brings them into closer competition that leads to an excessive incentive to invest ex post.
This model illustrates that foregone invention may occur even in a symmetric situation.
It also shows that market power need not take the form of monopoly in order to pose a
deterrent to innovation in related markets.
25In the example, there are initially two existing products, which are suﬃciently diﬀeren-
tiated horizontally that their vendors’ desired market shares do not come into conﬂict. In
the world of software, one example of such a pair might be a visual web page editor and an
HTML code editor. Though the products diﬀer, there is an opportunity to add a particular
feature (such as the ability to integrate with a new type of back-end data source) to either or
both of them. The demand for this feature, though unknown, is orthogonal to the horizontal
diﬀerentiation between the existing products. If only one of the two products oﬀers the new
feature, some customers may switch to the one with the new feature. Thus the invention of
the new feature brings the ﬁrms into closer competition.
The example is constructed as follows. Consumer i’s valuation of Firm M’s product is
θ0
i, while her valuation of Firm X’s product is 1−θ0
i. Consumer valuations θ0
i are distributed
uniformly on [0,1]. Consumer i’s valuation of the new feature is θ1
i, which with probability
γ is distributed uniformly on [0,1], and is 0 for all consumers otherwise. There are four
possible market structures, s ∈ {∅,M,X,MX}, and their static prices and proﬁts are as
follows:
• When s = ∅, each ﬁrm sets pj(∅) = 0.5 and earns proﬁts πj(∅) = 0.25. In this
example, the horizontal diﬀerentiation is calibrated so that all consumers are served
in equilibrium and each ﬁrm is able to earn monopoly proﬁts.
• When s = M and demand for the new feature is high, both ﬁrms set higher prices,
pM(M) = 0.832 and pX(M) = 0.534, than when s = ∅, even though only Firm M has
the new feature. This is because for any ﬁxed θ1 it is the consumers with intermediate
values of θ0
i who are most willing to switch from Firm X to Firm M. As a consequence,
Firm X now serves a population more heavily weighted toward having high values
for its basic product (i.e., low θ0), so it raises its price to extract more surplus from
them. Firm M, of course, now sees higher demand for its product, and raises its price
accordingly. Since both ﬁrms raise their prices, some customers with low values for
the new feature and intermediate values for each basic product now go unserved. The
resulting proﬁts are πM(M,1) = 0.472, and πX(M,1) = 0.195.
• When s = X and demand for the new feature is high, pX(X) = 0.832, pM(X) = 0.534,
πX(X,1) = 0.472, and πM(X,1) = 0.195.
• When s = MX and demand for the new feature is high, pM(MX) = pX(MX) = 0.75
and πM(MX,1) = πX(MX,1) = 0.352.
Proposition 4 shows that the proﬁt functions in this model lead to foregone invention.
26Proposition 4. In the Product Features example, if the prior distribution over demand
is suﬃciently pessimistic (γ < 0.707) then the region of foregone invention has positive
measure.
This conclusion indicates that ﬁrms may be deterred from developing new features for
their products by the possibility that adding those features will bring them into closer
competition with currently distant competitors. In this speciﬁcation of demand, the new
feature is quite valuable relative to the original products, so a ﬁrm will suﬀer badly if only
its competitor oﬀers the new feature. Thus the ex post incentive to develop the new feature
is strong, and invention is foregone over a large range of γ. Thus, in contrast to the Base
System model and the Bundling example, it is the prospect of losing market power, rather
than gaining market power, that drives ex post entry and thus reduces ex ante investment.
4.3 Divided Technical Leadership
The third example presents a situation in which Firm M’s existing power in a related market
is so threatened by Firm X’s introduction of a new product that Firm M is induced to develop
a new competing product ex post in order to protect its existing product. This leads to a
qualitatively diﬀerent set of conditions for foregone invention. The example exempliﬁes some
aspects of the “divided technical leadership” (DTL) hypothesis of Bresnahan and Greenstein
(1996), as applied to the recent history of the market for internet browsers. It is also
closely related to Carlton and Waldman (2002), which examines the ability of a monopolist
to extend its monopoly to the market for a newly emerging substitute. My purpose is
not to construct the deﬁnitive model of DTL, but rather to propose that DTL suggests that
platform leaders may seek to discourage the invention of complementary platform layers. The
example also illustrates how the conditions for foregone invention are qualitatively diﬀerent
when a dominant ﬁrm perceives its competitors’ investments as strategic complements.
The scenario is based on a stylized conception of Microsoft’s entry into the internet
browser market once Netscape’s browser became popular. Microsoft feared that the combi-
nation of Netscape’s browser and Sun’s Java Virtual Machine (JVM), as a middleware layer
on top of Windows, could potentially “commoditize” the underlying operating system.21 If
Netscape and Sun succeeded, Microsoft might be left to compete on price against other op-
erating system vendors while Netscape and Sun assumed the mantle of platform leadership.
The DTL hypothesis claims that such transitions are the usual course of change in the com-
puter industry: a new entrant develops a complementary computing layer to serve a market
segment distinct from that of the current platform leader, but once it achieves success in its
own market it exploits changing trends in the industry to wrest platform leadership from
21See Bresnahan (2001) for a discussion of Microsoft’s motivations based on internal strategy documents.
27the incumbent. Before Netscape popularized the browser, Microsoft faced only moderate
incentives to enter the browser market because it could gain at most monopoly proﬁts in
that market. Microsoft judged, perhaps rightly, that it could better allocate its development
resources to other projects ex ante. But once the browser-JVM combination threatened to
become successful, Microsoft entered the browser market in order to counter the challenge
to its leadership role. From Microsoft’s perspective, invesments were strategic complements:
its incentives to invest were greater once Netscape and Sun also invested, because if the
Netscape-Sun middleware product had succeeded then Microsoft could have faced severe
consequences in its existing markets.
In this example, Firm X can invent a complementary application (product a, and if
it turns out to be popular then Firm X can invent a rival base system (product d) two
periods later by investing cd in the second period. Firm X’s application works with ei-
ther base system. Firm M can also develop the complementary application, but Firm M’s
application works only with Firm M’s base system; Firm M cannot invent a new base sys-
tem. The only uncertainty is over the demand for the application, which, as in previous
models, is distributed uniformly on [0,1] with probability γ and is zero for all consumers
otherwise. I assume that each consumer buys only one application when Firm M is the
only base system vendor (in which case the cross-platform compatibility of Firm X’s appli-
cation’s oﬀers no advantage), so if Firm M bundles its application then no consumers buy
Firm X’s application, regardless of its price. Now there are six relevant market structures,
s ∈ {∅,M,X,MX,XX,MXX}, where XX indicates that Firm X has developed both an
application and a base system. Consumers’ values for Firm M’s base system θb
i are dis-
tributed uniformly on [1,2] and each consumer’s value for Firm X’s base system is 3 − θb
i
(which is also uniformly distributed on [1,2]).22
Proposition 5. In the DTL example, if cd < 1
1−δ 0.5 and δ > 0.113 then the region of
foregone invention has positive measure, regardless of the prior disribution over demand for
the application.
Because there may be up to three investments in this model, it does not ﬁt directly into
the basic framework. Instead, it is necessary to solve backward from the absorbing state,
MXX. This is accomplished for cd < 1
1−δ 0.5 in Lemma 3 (in the Appendix).
In contrast to the previous examples, the conditions for foregone invention in the DTL
example do not involve the level of uncertainty, γ. This is because Firm M’s ex post incentive
to use trivial bundling as an entry barrier to its base system market is higher than its ex
ante incentive to invent a complementary application of its own, even if γ = 1. The static
22Consumers’ base system valuations are higher by 1 than in the product features model. This is so that
under symmetric conditions Firm X’s new base system can capture some of Firm M’s potential base system
customers.
28prices and proﬁts in each market structure, below, generate this eﬀect because the invention
of a rival base system is disastrous for Firm M, compared to its fortunes when it shares the
application market with Firm X:
• When s = ∅, Firm M sets pb
M(∅) = 1 and earns πM(∅) = 1.
• When s = M and demand for the application is high, pb
M(M) = 1.272, pa
M(M) =
0.340, and πM(M,1) = 1.319.
• When s = X and demand for the application is high, pb
M(X) = 1.222, pa
X(X) = 0.488,
πM(X,1) = 1.060, and πX(X,1) = 0.238. Firm X’s application is popular.




M(MX,1) = 1.549, πM(MX,1) = 1.316, and πX(MX,1) = 0. Competition drives
the application price to zero. Since Firm M trivially bundles its application with its
base system, no consumers purchase Firm X’s application.
• When s = XX and demand for the application is high, pb
M(XX) = 0.928, pd
X(XX) =
pda
X (XX) = 1.297, and pa
X(XX) = 0.655. Firm X trivially bundles the application
with its base system, but those who buy Firm M’s base system must pay a high price
for the application. Proﬁts are πM(XX,1) = 0.431 and πX(XX,1) = 0.776.23





X(MXX) = 1, and πM(MXX,1) = πX(MXX,1) = 0.5.
These static market outcomes give Firm M a large incentive to enter the application
market once Firm X has entered and revealed high demand, because failure of Firm M to
enter would allow Firm X to develop a rival base system, cutting Firm M’s proﬁts roughly in
half. In contrast, when Firm X does not enter, Firm M has little interest in the application
market because even if demand is sure to be high it can increase its proﬁts by only about
30%. Hence Firm M perceives entry as strategic complements, even while Firm X perceives
entry as strategic substitutes. In such a situation, uncertainty is not required to put a wedge
between Firm M’s ex ante and ex post incentives, and hence Firm X can be deterred from
entering even when it is common knowledge that demand is high.24
23There is actually a superior, but quantitatively insigniﬁcant solution in which Firm X also oﬀers its base
system sans application at a slightly lower price. The change in proﬁts for each ﬁrm is less than 10
−4.
24In reality, Netscape did develop a browser and Sun did develop its JVM. In the context of the model, this
could mean that their development costs were suﬃciently low that Microsoft’s ability to force the browser
price to zero and to exclude them from the base system market was not suﬃcient to deter their initial
investment. Outside the model, it is also possible that Netscape and Sun misjudged Microsoft’s ability to
overcome the network externalities that they had built up through wide distribution of the browser and
JVM. On the other hand, Netscape and Sun may have judged the situation properly and merely experienced
a bad realization from among a range of possible outcomes.
295 Discussion
This paper deals with the dynamic consequences of ex post competition when heterogeneous
inventors face uncertain demand. Demand uncertainty leads only low–entry cost ﬁrms to
invent ex ante, but high–entry cost ﬁrms may wish to enter ex post if demand is revealed to
be high. The prospect of ex post competition from high–entry cost ﬁrms dampens the ex
ante incentives of low–entry cost ﬁrms, so that invention is foregone over an intermediate
region of entry cost proﬁles. Proposition 1 gave suﬃcient conditions in a simple two-stage
game for the region of foregone invention to have positive measure: at least one ﬁrm perceives
investments as strategic substitutes; and expected ex post competition (Eq. 4), such that
with positive probability demand is high enough that the other ﬁrm enters ex post when its
entry costs are high enough that it would not enter ex ante. Although foregone invention can
occur in symmetric situations, the problem is more likely to occur when one ﬁrm earns high
monopoly proﬁts and low duopoly proﬁts, while the other ﬁrm earns high duopoly proﬁts.
Throughout, I have taken an agnostic stance regarding the entry costs of each potential
inventor. That is, I have expressed the results either as contingent on a particular cost
proﬁle, or as statements about regions of cost proﬁles. The idea behind this stance is
that the development of any particular invention poses a unique set of challenges, and that
each potential inventor will approach these challenges in its own way. For example, in the
context of the Base System model, where Firm M is interpreted as Microsoft, for one kind
of application one may believe that Microsoft has a low entry cost due to its knowledge
of the inner workings of the Windows operating system. For another kind of application,
one may believe that a startup funded by venture capital has a low entry cost, due to
the strong incentives that its ﬁnancial structure provides to its software engineers. These
kinds of beliefs, aggregated across possible inventions, can be interpreted as a probability
distribution over cost proﬁles, which in principle could be combined with knowledge about
the region of foregone invention to yield the expected proportion of inventions that would
be foregone. Empirically, such aggregation is hardly feasible, but the thought experiment
gives a qualitative feel for how the problem of foregone invention can be viewed.
Of the three main factors that contribute to foregone invention—demand uncertainty,
entry cost heterogeneity, and asymmetric market power—demand uncertainty has perhaps
been the least studied. In the literature on invention, there are two main types of models.
The ﬁrst type gives several ﬁrms the opportunity to invest in developing a product for which
demand is known, but the success or failure of their development eﬀorts is dependent on
their investments, often with a stochastic shock. Typically a patent system is assumed, so
that competition takes the form of a race, with a single winner. Loury (1979), Dasgupta and
Stiglitz (1980), and Reinganum (1981, 1982) are early works in this literature; notable re-
30cent contributions include d’Aspremont, Bhattacharya, and Gérard-Varet (2000), Denicolò
(2000), Weeds (2002), and Doraszelski (2003). Adding demand uncertainty to such models
adds no new insights, since the prize for winning the race is simply the expected monopoly
proﬁts.25 The second type of model gives just one ﬁrm the opportunity to invent a product
for which demand is known, but a second ﬁrm may imitate or otherwise exploit the inven-
tion ex post. Such models are designed to help determine optimal patent policy given the
tradeoﬀs between incentives for the initial invention and the beneﬁts of subsequent com-
petition or sequential innovations. Notable examples include Gilbert and Shapiro (1990),
Klemperer (1990), Gallini (1992), Chang (1995), Green and Scotchmer (1995), Schankerman
and Scotchmer (2001), and Anton and Yao (2003, 2004). But in these kinds of models, one
ﬁrm is given an exogenous monopoly over the ability to develop the primary innovation;
the question arises why other ﬁrms cannot also develop the primary innovation. My basic
framework can address such questions by varying the ability of each ﬁrm to invest in the
primary innovation, i.e., by taking development costs as a parameter. The key new insight
is that under these circumstances imitation poses no threat to innovation unless there is
uncertainty over the demand for the invention.
A notable exception to the generalizations above is work by Jensen (1992a, 2001, 2004),
which examines two ﬁrms that can invest in an innovation of uncertain success. As in the
present paper, after one ﬁrm invests the success or failure of the innovation is revealed to all,
and in the case of success the second ﬁrm can then invest it in the second period.26 Jensen
(1992a) and Jensen (2001) diﬀer somewhat from the basic framework of Section 2, but would
ﬁt if modiﬁed such that neither ﬁrm could invest in the second period if neither invested in
the ﬁrst period. Jensen (1992a) focuses on the incentives of a third party inventor to license
an innovation, but as a baseline considers a model with symmetric ﬁrms that can adopt an
innovation of unknown success at a ﬁxed cost, and identiﬁes a threshold for the probability
of success below which neither ﬁrm adopts. Both Jensen’s 2001 and 2004 papers focus on
the identity of the ﬁrst mover rather than on the prospect of foregone invention. Jensen
(2001) considers a multiproduct ﬁrm competing against a startup, and both can introduce a
new product. For the multiproduct ﬁrm, success or failure will aﬀect its reputation and thus
its proﬁt ﬂows from its existing products. Under the assumption that investment costs are
equal across ﬁrms, Jensen identiﬁes a threshold probability of success below which neither
ﬁrm invests. Jensen (2004), which ﬁts into the basic framework, considers a large ﬁrm with
25Weeds (2002) models demand as a stochastic process, leading ﬁrms to want to delay innovation in order
to see if demand is likely to be high. However, unlike in the present paper, no new information is revealed
by the actions of the ﬁrms.
26In addition, Reinganum (1983) and Jensen (1992b) consider one-period, two-ﬁrm problems with inven-
tion under uncertainty, but since no investment is allowed after the uncertainty is resolved, there is no threat
of ex post entry or imitation. The public resolution of uncertainty serves only to simplify the computation
of equilibrium.
31two plants competing against a small ﬁrm with one plant, and both can invest in a cost-
reducing innovation of uncertain success. Under the assumptions that (i) any adopter in
the ﬁrst period earns zero proﬁts in that period from the plant in which it adopts, and (ii)
the ﬁxed cost of adoption is zero, Jensen identiﬁes a threshold probability of success below
which neither ﬁrm invests. The results in the present paper indicate that for probabilities
near the thresholds identiﬁed in Jensen (1992a, 2001, 2004), invention is foregone because
at least one ﬁrm would prefer to invest if it could be assured that the other ﬁrm would
not subsequently invest. Furthermore, the basic framework herein generalizes the foregone
invention content of these analyses by allowing the costs and beneﬁts of entry to vary across
ﬁrms, so as to enable identiﬁcation of the region of foregone invention as a function of the
cost parameters.
Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) look at a related problem in which there may be
several private startup ﬁrms operating under similar circumstances, and the ﬁrst one to make
its initial public oﬀering reveals information about capital market conditions that is useful
to its followers. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms go public too late relative to the social optimum, unless
investment banks can force several of the ﬁrms to go public at the same time, or enforce a
transfer payment from the followers to the leader. Although the Benveniste, Busaba, and
Wilhelm model shares an informational externality eﬀect with the model considered here,
their model does not allow for competitive eﬀects among the ﬁrms. So they say that the ﬁrst
ﬁrm goes public too late, even though the it does so at a time that is optimal from its own
perspective, and the presence or absence of the follower ﬁrms has no eﬀect on its decision.
In the present paper, each ﬁrm’s optimum in the absence of the other ﬁrm, rather than the
social optimum, is the standard of comparison for determining when invention is foregone.
The structure of the basic framework is also related to the game theoretic literature on
limit pricing and signaling, beginning with Milgrom and Roberts (1982). This literature
considers a situation that begins after one ﬁrm has already entered to become the incum-
bent, and possesses private information about the market that a potential entrant would
want to know when it makes its entry decision. This information could concern production
costs, as in Milgrom and Roberts examples, or it could concern demand. If demand is low,
the incumbent may wish to signal this to deter potential entrants, and this signaling can be
eﬀective if there exists a reasonable equilibrium with some separation. A separating equi-
librium in this signaling game between incumbent and entrant can be seen as the second
stage of the basic framework considered here, since separation implies that the second-stage
entrant learns about demand before entering. Gertner, Gibbons, and Scharfstein (1988)
consider the problem of a ﬁrm that wants to release ﬁnancial information to capital mar-
kets, but is worried that rivals may also make use of that information. However, Gertner
et al. ﬁnd that all reasonable equilibria in their model are pooling, so that information is
32not revealed.
In contrast to demand uncertainty, asymmetric market power has received signiﬁcant
attention in the literature on innovation. When it is not the simple consequence of an
inherent entry cost advantage or demand advantage, asymmetric market power typically
stems from some sort of complementarity. A number of static results, including Chen and
Ross (1998), Economides and Salop (1992), and stemming back to Cournot (1838), demon-
strate that complementarity between markets makes a vertically integrated monopoly the
socially preferred market structure. A number of authors have investigated dynamic con-
sequences of these static results. Whinston (1990), Bakos and Brynjolfsson (2000), and
Nalebuﬀ (2000, 2004) indicate that a ﬁrm with products in multiple markets can tie its
products together to deter entry or induce exit, to the detriment of society. Stefanadis
(1997) and Choi and Stefanadis (2001) consider investment in cost-reducing improvements
with uncertain technological success, and show that the threat of bundling or downstream
foreclosure can reduce ex ante investment. Unlike my basic framework, their models do not
allow ﬁrms to take advantage of information revealed by their competitors. Carlton and
Waldman (2002) demonstrate how a monopolist in one market can extend its monopoly to
another market. Farrell and Katz (2000) show that a monopolist in one market may invest
too much in uncertain quality improvement for its complement while alternative suppliers
invest too little; their analysis assumes ex ante symmetric investment costs and ascribes
the uncertainty to technology rather than demand. Heeb (2003) investigates incremental
quality improvement in a series of models similar to my Base System model, and ﬁnds that
the base system monopolist faces greater incentives to invest in incrementally improving the
application than an independent supplier. Adding heterogeneous entry costs and demand
uncertainty to these types of models can lead to foregone invention.
Patents are the usual answer to problems of insuﬃcient ex ante invention incentives.
But for some entry cost proﬁles invention occurs without patents, and in such cases patents
are harmful because they reduce ex post competition. Such competition is particularly
important when there is scope for incremental quality improvement, because a ﬁrm that
faces no competition ex post has less incentive to improve on its invention. Bessen and
Maskin (2002) examine a sequential innovation model with hidden entry costs, uncertain
technology, and free imitation. They ﬁnd that ex post competition (when patents are not
imposed) increases the incentive to innovate, because inventors look forward to being able
to imitate subsequent improvements invented by others.27 One ﬁnal problem with patents
27 In their model, each ﬁrm that invests in developing a sequential improvement draws its probability of
success independently, so it always has some incentive to invest even when its competitor also invests. I
conjecture that putting the uncertainty on the demand side and allowing asymmetric ex post market power
would lead to the foregone invention problem, although ex post competition could still drive innovation in
cost regions outside the region of foregone invention.
33is that, even if they could be helpful in concept, it is diﬃcult to apply the legal framework of
the patent system to categories of software applications, both because software applications
typically make use of previously patented technologies (see Bessen 2003), and because reverse
engineering is legal and patent law does not necessarily threaten penalties severe enough to
prevent imitation (see Anton and Yao 2004).
As for Microsoft, the results in this paper suggest that its monopoly over operating
systems can pose a deterrent to innovation that has the potential to harm both society
and Microsoft, but also that many policies that could eliminate or reduce this threat could
have other negative eﬀects on innovation. One commonly considered policy is to reduce
Microsoft’s ability to exclude its rivals other than by pricing. But the models show that
such a policy is likely to fall short of solving the problem. Perhaps it is helpful to think
of Microsoft as merely a dominant ﬁrm, rather than a true monopolist in the operating
system market. The presence of multiple operating system vendors can help independent
application developers in the ex post market, because they can market their applications
for several platforms, while each operating system vendor can trivially bundle only with its
own operating system. Competition may also drive incremental improvements in operating
systems. In a static framework, on the other hand, if there are beneﬁts of standardization
on Windows then the continued presence of alternate operating systems means that some of
these beneﬁts are foregone. Likewise, development costs are likely to be higher for products
that run on multiple operating systems. In the end, the results in this paper suggest that—
although no policy option oﬀers a sure solution—any policy that might be implemented
should be made explicit ex ante so as to encourage complementors and competitors to
innovate. A reliance on ex post litigation to enforce restrictions could increase both the
uncertainty and the expense of ex ante entry, undermining the goal of improving ex ante
incentives.
Appendix: Proofs and supporting results
Lemma 1. Let s∗
j (ω,cj) and z∗
j(ω,cj) indicate the market structure and Firm j’s investment cost,












28This speciﬁcation assumes that a ﬁrm indiﬀerent to entry will not enter. This assumption plays no role
in the analysis since ﬁrms almost always (taking their investment costs as a parameter) strictly prefer to
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for some ﬁrm j, and also the inequality in Eq. 9 is strict for ﬁrm −j.
Proof. The proof operates by backward induction. In the second period, if only ﬁrm −j has already
entered, the market structure resulting from ﬁrm j’s sequentially optimal action is given by s∗
j(ω,cj).
Hence the ﬁrst period reduced game, taking sequentially optimal actions into account, is represented























































































Then Eq. 9 (for both ﬁrms) is the necessary and suﬃcient for (out1
M,out1
X) to be a Nash equilibrium
of this normal form game. Also, Eq. 9 with strict inequality for ﬁrm −j and weak inequality for
ﬁrm j, combined with Eq. 10 for ﬁrm j, are necessary and suﬃcient conditions for there to be no
other Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 2. In the basic framework under Assumptions 1–4, let










Suppose that investments are strategic substitutes for Firm X; then there exists ε > 0 such that,
given entry cost ˆ cX − ε,
1. If cM < ˜ cM then Firm X does not enter the empty market in the ﬁrst period in any subgame
perfect equilibrium
2. If cM > ˜ cM then Firm X enters the empty market in the ﬁrst period in every subgame perfect
equilibrium
35Proof. Positive proﬁts and common demand imply that ˜ cM > 0. This fact combined with common













for all cM < ˜ cM. Hence, given an entry cost proﬁle (cM,ˆ cX) with cM < ˜ cM, Firm X’s strict best
response (in the ﬁrst period reduced game) to out1
M is out1
X:




















That investments are strategic substitutes for Firm X further implies that Firm X’s strict best
response (in the ﬁrst period reduced game) to in1
M is out1
X:































where the strict inequality is by strategic substitutes and the weak inequality is because Firm X will
enter ex post only if by doing so it improves its proﬁts. Choose ε > 0 suﬃciently small that both
of these strict best responses continue to hold at cX = ˆ cX − ε. Then, given an entry cost proﬁle
(cM,ˆ cX −ε) with cM > ˜ cM, Firm X’s optimal ﬁrst period action is in1
X. The argument for cM > ˜ cM
is similar. 
Proof of Proposition 1 (page 9). Eq. 4 and competitiveness imply that ˆ cM < ˜ cM, so by Lemma 2,
given entry cost proﬁle (ˆ cM,ˆ cX − εX) with εX > 0 suﬃciently small, Firm X does not enter in any
subgame perfect equilibrium even though it would strictly prefer to enter given an entry cost proﬁle
(cM,ˆ cX −εX) with cM > ˜ cM. This is also true at (ˆ cM +εM,ˆ cX −εX), for εM > 0 suﬃciently small,
where Firm M also does not enter in any subgame perfect equilibrium. 















































36Finally, Firm X perceives investments as strategic substitutes because Firm X always earns zero
proﬁts when it does not invest. Thus the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisﬁed. 


















































Finally, Firm X perceives investments as strategic substitutes because Firm X earns zero proﬁts
whenever it does not invest. Thus the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisﬁed. 
Lemma 3. When cd < 1
1−δ 0.5, the Divided Technical Leadership model is equivalent to the basic
framework with
π2







0.431 if cM > δ
1−δ 0.069











0.776 if cM > δ
1−δ 0.069
0.5 if cM < δ
1−δ 0.069,
(22)
and for all states (s,ω) 6= (X,1) with s ∈ {∅,M,X,MX}, π1




Proof. Solve backward from the absorbing state, MXX, to states X, M, and MX. If s = XX, then
Firm M invests if cM < 1
1−δ 0.069. If s = MX then Firm X cannot invest, because its application
is not popular. If s = M, then Firm X does not invest. If s = X and one period has already
elapsed since Firm X invented the application, then Firm X’s best response to no investment by
Firm M is to invest if cd < 1
1−δ 0.538; Firm M’s mutual best response is indeed not to invest if
cM > 1
1−δ 0.069. Firm X’s best response to investment by Firm M in this situation is to invest
if cd < 1
1−δ 0.5; Firm M’s mutual best response is indeed to invest if cM < 1
1−δ 0.069. If s = X
and Firm X has just invented the application, Firm M can switch to state MX by investing, the
incentives for which are accounted for in the basic framework. 
37Lemma 4. Assuming that investments are strategic substitutes for Firm X, suppose that second








































































This implies the condition in Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5 (page 28). Suppose that cd < 1
1−δ 0.5. If cM > 1



















while if cM < 1


















Both these conditions are satisﬁed when δ > 0.113, so by Lemma 4 invention is foregone. 
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